Ransomware backup and cyber recovery

The backup exists. Now prove you can recover.

We design and test recovery for ransomware and destructive attacks: immutable copies, isolated identities, a clean recovery environment, business priorities and runbooks that can be executed under pressure.

3 layers: production, protected copy, clean recovery
1 documented and testable recovery path
0 assumptions accepted without validation
01Architecture

An attacker should not be able to erase production and your last chance of recovery.

Modern ransomware targets backup infrastructure, administrative accounts and restore mechanisms. Resilience comes from separating these dependencies and validating them together.

Separate identity

Distinct accounts, roles and administrative paths for backup, with minimum access and controlled break-glass mechanisms.

  • MFA and privileged access
  • Separate administration domain
  • Logging and alerting

Protected copies

Immutability, isolation and retention are tested against compromise scenarios, not only operational mistakes.

  • Immutable or offline
  • Tiered retention
  • Configuration protection

Clean recovery

A controlled environment where identity, images and data are verified before services return to production.

  • Integrity validation
  • Restore sequence
  • Return criteria
02Business continuity

Recover services, not just files.

A restored database does not mean the service works. Identity, DNS, network, applications, integration and teams must return in an executable order.

Credible RTO and RPO

Objectives are tied to real technical capability and operating impact, not copied from a template.

Executable runbook

Explicit roles, approvals, dependencies, steps, checkpoints and escalation criteria.

Cross-functional exercise

Infrastructure, security, applications, management and communications work through one scenario.

03Method

Design for the day production control is lost.

Assessment starts with critical services and compromise scenarios. We trace each dependency to a protected copy and a safe way to return it to operation.

  1. 01

    Map critical services

    What must return, in what order, with which data and identity, network and supplier dependencies.

  2. 02

    Threat-model backup

    How accounts, consoles, repositories, keys and the control plane could be compromised.

  3. 03

    Architecture and runbook

    Protection tiers, access, retention, clean environment and technical recovery sequence.

  4. 04

    Test and improve

    Run a controlled scenario, measure time, capture blockers and update the plan from evidence.

04Outcome

A recovery capability you can demonstrate.

Deliverables connect technical architecture to operational decisions and create a measurable baseline for future exercises.

01

Recovery dependency map

Services, data, identities, platforms and suppliers in the order required for return.

02

Target architecture

Separation, immutability, access, retention, monitoring and clean recovery for the environment.

03

Operational runbook

Steps, roles, evidence, decision points and communications for a destructive incident.

04

Exercise report

Measured time, observed blockers, residual risk and prioritized backlog.

05Frequently asked questions

The questions separating backup from recovery.

Answers must be validated through architecture and exercises. If they exist only in policy, the risk remains.

What is immutable backup?

A copy that cannot be changed or deleted during its defined retention period, including by ordinary administrative accounts. Effectiveness also depends on identity, configuration, isolation and control-plane protection.

Is the 3-2-1 rule enough against ransomware?

It is a useful starting point, not a guarantee. Access to copies, identity separation, data integrity, application dependencies and actual restore capability still need validation.

How often should recovery be tested?

Frequency should reflect environment change and service criticality. Tests can range from regular technical restores to full cross-functional exercises for high-impact services.

How is disaster recovery different from cyber recovery?

Disaster recovery usually addresses outage and infrastructure failure. Cyber recovery assumes the environment, identities and backup may be compromised and adds isolation, integrity checks and clean-environment restoration.

Can you work with our existing backup technology?

Yes. The approach is vendor-neutral. We assess whether existing architecture and operations meet recovery scenarios and recommend change based on risk, not automatic platform replacement.

06 Next step

Risk does not disappear when you delay it.

Tell us what needs to be protected, tested or recovered. The first conversation is confidential, direct and free of product pitches.

INITIAL ASSESSMENT

Two minutes. Clear context. A human response.

Choose the need, provide essential context and your request goes directly to the senior team.

A senior consultant will respond directly
OR EMAIL DIRECTLY contact@heyvalue.ro

Do not include passwords, sensitive logs or incident details in your first email. We will establish a secure channel together.

heyvalue security
STEP 1 OF 2Assessment type
What needs to be protected, tested or recovered?